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Before and After 
Grenada
By Linus A. Hoskins
In 1823 the Monroe Doctrine justified “U. S. interference in any and every­thing not be her liking in either the North or the South of the continent.” 
Such interventionist policy has since be­
come a permanent feature of U. S. policy 
toward the Caribbean and the Western 
hemisphere.
The Caribbean has always been ic- 
garded as an American backyard and, ipso 
facto, within the U. S. sphere of influence. 
Respect for the national sovereignty and 
integrity of the Caribbean nations and 
their people has been regarded as of 
minor importance.
Indeed recent events have shown that 
the United States pursued a “big stick” 
policy of destructive engagement toward 
specific Caribbean countries. This policy 
has been carried out in collusion with 
other selected Caribbean governments.
The Carter Policy
When the Carter administration came to 
power, one of its first pronouncements 
would be priority attention to the Carib­
bean. This was supposed to mark “a new 
era of friendship and cooperation be­
tween Washington and a one-time Amer­
ican lake sprinkled with emerging new 
ministates determined not only to be in­
dependent but to act independently.”1 
In August 1977, Rosalyn Carter, Sec­
retary of State Cyrus Vance, and U.N. 
Ambassador Andrew Young, visited the 
Caribbean on goodwill missions “of 
atonement of United States transgres­
sions in the region” as part of the Carter 
administration’s objective to “spin a new 
policy web around a region long neglected
by Washington power brokers obsessed 
with East-West relations.”2
Ambassador Young indicated that the 
purpose of the Caribbean tour was to con­
vince Caribbean leaders that the Carter 
administration meant to pay more atten­
tion to what they said and what they 
wanted for their countries and to meddle 
less in how they and their people choose 
to run their affairs, especially Guyana and 
Jamaica, the latter then under the stew­
ardship of Prime Minister Michael Man- 
ley. He stressed that the Carter admini­
stration did not look with hostility at their 
choice of Socialism and did not see a 
threat in their friendly ties with President 
Fidel Castro of Cuba.3 He also expressed 
the idea of “an integrated Caribbean part­
nership as being in the interest of the 
United States and its neighbors.”4 
Former Ambassador Terence Todman 
put the Carter policy toward the Carib­
bean this way:
U. S. official involvement with the Eng­
lish-speaking Caribbean was extremely 
limited while our substantial involve­
ment in the affairs of the Spanish­
speaking Caribbean was, . . . often 
aimed in the wrong direction. In the 
past, security interests have been the 
overriding concern of the U.S. govern­
ment in its dealing with the Caribbean,
. . . what we seek in the Caribbean to­
day is not domination, disproportionate 
influence, or the right to intervene in 
other nations internal affairs. We seek 
instead a mature, healthy relationship 
with all states in the region, founded on 
respect for sovereignty, recognition of
NEW DIRECTIONS OCTOBER 1984
!
common interests and consultation on
matters of mutual concern . . . . 5
President Carter also reaffirmed the 
“vital interest” of the Caribbean to the 
United States and America’s firm commit­
ment to human rights, democratization, 
significant support for economic develop­
ment, acceptance and respect for ide­
ological pluralism, unequivocal respect 
for national sovereignty, strong encour­
agement of regional cooperation, an ac­
tive Caribbean role in world affairs and 
non-intervention in the Caribbean be­
cause America saw herself “as part of the 
Caribbean community” — a position 
which was quite unpopular and suspect 
among many Caribbean peoples.
Perplexed by rapid turnovers of gov­
ernments in the Eastern Caribbean (a 
coup in Grenada, the downfall of Patrick 
John’s administration in Dominica, the 
electoral defeat of John Compton in St. 
Lucia, and the rising tide of discontent in 
Guyana and Antigua), then Secretary of 
State Vance dispatched State Depart­
ment specialist Philip Habib “to test the 
Caribbean pulse, perhaps to help the Car­
ter administration make some adjust­
ments in the ‘bright-spot’ — ‘trouble-spot’ 
evaluation. ”6
It is noteworthy that Habib selectively 
excluded Grenada from his itinerary. He 
visited St. Lucia and Antigua, where anti- 
Cuban sentiments were very strong, but 
ignored St. Vincent. A subsequent Habib 
report urged an increase in the regional 
aid program which totaled about $155 mil­
lion in fiscal 1979 to stem the tide against 
an apparent Cuban Communist influence 
and aggression.
The Carter administration then estab­
lished the Caribbean Task Force at Key 
West, Florida, as one component of the 
U.S. Forces Caribbean Command. Con­
sisting of a staff of 75 persons, the Task 
Force’s mission was to monitor develop­
ments in the Caribbean, conduct training 
exercises, and devise contingency plans 
for the use of U.S. forces, as a means of 
combating Cuban Communist infiltration 
into the island nations in the area. Under 
the plan, the United States, Britain, and 
Canada would provide coast guard-type 
training in Barbados and possibly sell pa­
trol boats to that country and others.
Barbados took the lead in forming a 
coast guard and in return for its pro-West­
ern efforts received $5 million in Foreign 
Military Sales (FMS) credits and $84,000 
in International Military and Education
Training (IMET) funds. The proposed co­
ordinated patrol force also included, in ad­
dition to Barbados, St. Lucia, St. Vin­
cent, and Dominica.
Caribbean leaders, however, were 
much less alarmed at the spread of Cuban 
influence than was the Carter administra­
tion. They have argued that acceptance of 
Cuban help did not signify embrace of 
Communist doctrine, but rather admira­
tion for those parts of the Cuban system 
— education, health and social organiza­
tion — that worked in the very conditions 
that stymied progress in other Caribbean 
islands.
“Grenada.. .  angered the 
United States by voting 
along with Cuba against 
the United Nations 
General Assembly 




Yet the Carter administration was ob­
sessed with the spectre of Soviet domina­
tion of the Caribbean as supposedly 
evidenced by the Soviet Union trying to 
secure its base in Cuba by surrounding it 
with friendly nations, by “totalitarian 
Marxist’s” control of Grenada, and Cuban 
advisers training guerrillas in Grenada for 
subversive action in Trinidad, and by 
Fidel Castro’s grand design to forge a 
Marxist axis running across the Carib­
bean from Grenada to Jamaica to Havana. 
As Abraham Lowenthal surmises:
. . . the preoccupation of the State De­
partment and the White House with 
Fidel Castro (did) not sit well with most 
Caribbean leaders who perceive(d) 
Castro as only one of the many Carib­
bean actors rather than as a Cold War 
instrument. . . 7
The Cuban Furor
The Carter administration’s concern 
about the restlessness and revolutionary 
mood sweeping through the Caribbean 
resulted from several factors: the first 
was the March 13, 1979, overthrow of the 
Eric Gairy government in Grenada by the
New Jewel Movement led by Maurice 
Bishop. The United States publicly ac­
cused Cuba of instigating and assisting in 
the overthrow. However, a confidential 
CIA report dismissed the accusation and 
concluded that “as far as we can tell, the 
coup occurred . . . from local circum­
stances. The Soviets had nothing to do 
with it or the Cubans either. ”8
In addition, the development of ex­
tremely close ties between Cuba and 
Grenada also worried the Carter adminis­
tration to the extent that when Grenada 
and Cuba established diplomatic relations 
on April 16, 1979, Frank Ortiz, the United 
States ambassador to the Eastern Carib­
bean stationed in Barbados, delivered a 
note to Prime Minister Bishop in which 
the Carter administration indicated that 
the United States government would 
view with “grave concern and displeas­
ure” any tendency on the part of Grenada 
to develop military ties with Cuba.9 As a 
riposte, Prime Minister Bishop in a radio 
broadcast denounced the United States 
hegemonism as follows:
. . .  No one, no matter how mighty and 
powerful they are will be permitted to 
dictate to the government of Grenada 
who we can be friendly with and what 
kind of friendly relations we must have 
with other countries . . . io
Grenada also angered the United 
States by voting along with Cuba against 
the United Nations General Assembly 
resolution in January 1980 which strongly 
condemned Soviet aggression in Afghani­
stan; by its support for the Sandinistas in 
the Nicaraguan revolution; by its soli­
darity with the popular struggle against 
the military dictatorship in El Salvador 
(which the United States supports); and 
by its support for the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) which the United 
States only recognizes as a “terrorist 
organization. ”
The second factor of concern to the 
United States was the election of leaders 
in St. Lucia, who vowed to limit foreign 
investment and were especially friendly 
toward Cuba; the third was the presence 
of 450 Cuban personnel in Jamaica, in­
cluding alleged high-ranking Cuban intel­
ligence officers (DGI), some of whom had 
Soviet (KGB) connections; the fourth 
was the presence of 100 Cubans in 
Guyana, 350 in Grenada, and 15 in St. 
Lucia.
As is evident from Prime Minister
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Bishop’s statement, his government al­
ways opposed United States hegemonic 
policy toward the Caribbean and inter­
ference in Grenada’s internal affairs. 
However, Grenada had always sought 
“normal and friendly relations” with the 
United States and insisted that “countries 
must have the right to pursue their own 
process.” The government of Grenada 
also viewed the decision of President Car­
ter to increase United States military 
presence in the Caribbean as “unjustified” 
and a “very serious threat” that was not 
only designed to contribute to tension in 
the region but also to serve as a counter­
productive force against “progressive 
change” in the region. One retaliatory 
measure the PRG took was to organize a 
“popular army and a people’s militia” to 
defend its sovereignty.
In addition, in May 1979 the govern­
ment of Grenada accused the CIA of hav­
ing drawn up a pyramid-shaped plan to 
destabilize Grenada. The plan called for, 
inter alia, instigating and organizing 
strikes throughout the island, planting 
false reports about Grenada in [the me­
dia], and encouraging prominent per­
sons, organizations, and governments in 
the region to attack the Grenadian 
revolution.
The government also accused the 
United States of complicity in a June 19, 
1980 bomb explosion directly under the 
platform from which the Prime Minister 
was addressing a mass rally. [He] was not 
hurt but two persons were killed and sev­
eral others were severely wounded. And 
in November 1980, the security forces 
defused an attempt to overthrow the Peo­
ple’s Revolutionary Government of Gre­
nada (PRG). Again direct United States 
involvement was evidenced by the sei­
zure of documents which proved that 
three American ships from Miami were to 
arrive at three strategic coastal locations 
in Grenada, viz, Gouyave, Grenville and 
Westerhall, to deliver arms and about 100 
mercenaries.
The reasons for the United States at­
tempts to destabilize Grenada have al­
ready been outlined. What needs to be 
emphasized here is that the United States 
government did not care much about what 
the Grenadian revolution was doing for 
the masses of Grenadian people. What 
was important was the so-called security 
interest of the United States.
The United States was well aware that 
the poverty stricken Caribbean region
was in ferment. It also saw a revolution in 
Grenada coming on top of the earlier 
Cuban revolution. It was therefore wor­
ried about a revolutionary virus spreading 
throughout the region. Even though Gre­
nada is a small country, any revolution 
there was significant to the United States 
due to the fact that it could serve as a par­
adigm to other Caribbean islands that are 
experiencing similar conditions.
The Reagan Policy
When the [Reagan] administration came 
to power, its primary foreign policy goal 
was to stem the tide against perceived
“The administration sees 
the Caribbean ‘as an area 
of opportunity for the 
U.S.’”
worldwide Soviet aggression in general 
and to “draw the line” against supposed 
Cuban Communist adventurism in the 
Caribbean and Latin America, in 
particular.
There is no hesitation on the part of the 
Reagan administration as to what U.S. 
policy should be toward the Caribbean. 
The administration sees the Caribbean 
“as an area of opportunity for the U. S. ” 
This immutable policy stance differs 
drastically from that of the Carter admin­
istration, which has been accused of pur­
suing a regional policy of failure and 
inability. For example, the Carter admin­
istration is accused of being unable to de­
termine just what the Cubans and the 
Soviets were up to in the region, how vis­
ible the U. S. should be in the Caribbean, 
and whether and how it should compete 
with the ubiquitous Cubans.
In comparing the two administrations’ 
policy objectives/positions toward the 
Cubans, one State Department official is 
reported to have said:
. . .  The Carter administration got in­
volved with the region out of a sense of 
well-intentioned but vaguely focused
altruism. The Reagan people are moti­
vated primarily by fear that the Cubans 
and behind them the Russians, will be 
coming across our southern borders if 
we don't involve ourselves aggressively 
in the area . . . 11
President Reagan himself has stated 
that the Carter administration was “woe­
fully lacking” in its response to alleged 
Soviet-backed subversion in the Carib­
bean and Communist activity in Central 
America. The President has interpreted 
his 1980 political mandate as “the restora­
tion of the nation’s power and prestige in 
response to a heightened neglected So­
viet threat. ” This interpretation refers to 
the so-called Reagan Doctrine which 
means the “subordination of all major pol­
icies to revitalizing the containment of 
Soviet expansion.”12 
The Reagan administration has re­
jected the “strategic passivity” of the Car­
ter administration and is convinced that 
the Carter administration’s reaction to 
the “most brazen imperial drive in his­
tory” by the Soviet Union and its ally, 
Cuba, had been too little and too late.
There are three major components of 
the Reagan administration’s policy to­
ward the Caribbean:
(i) Support for free elections and 
broadly based democratic institu­
tions as the best way for each country to 
pursue its development according to the 
wishes of its people;
(ii) The Caribbean Basin Initiative 
(CBI) to help Basin economies overcome 
structural underdevelopment. This pro­
posed integrated program of trade, in­
vestment, and financial assistance has as 
its centerpiece a U.S. offer of one-way 
free trade to the region’s smaller coun­
tries. It also seeks authority to offer U. S. 
firms significant tax incentives for new in­
vestment and to increase direct financial 
assistance for both urgent balance-of- 
payments problems and longer term 
structural imbalances;
(iii) Collective security efforts and 
security assistance to help democrat­
ically-oriented governments resist vio­
lent, externally supported insurgents 
who would impose totalitarian regimes 
hostile to the United States.
It is interesting to note that the admin­
istration’s Caribbean policy also has im­
plications beyond the Caribbean. As a 
result of its determination to counter per­
ceived growing Cuban and Soviet intru­
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sion into the region, the administration 
has mistakingly placed Caribbean issues 
within a Cold War, East-West confronta­
tional matrix. Ipso facto, it has annihilated 
President Carter’s policy of respect for 
national sovereignty and “ideological plu­
ralism” in the Caribbean.
While Caribbean governments regard 
the area as a “zone of peace,” the Reagan 
administration regards the area a “battle­
ground in the global confrontation with 
the Soviet Union. ”
The Reagan administration came into 
office loudly expressing its determination 
to turn back the Cuban Communist tide 
sweeping the Caribbean. As a result, 
Cuba’s activities abroad became the 
“focal point” of the administration’s atten­
tion and it sounded the warning signal that 
alleged Cuban adventurism abroad as re­
flected by the deployment of 40,000 to
50,000 Cuban soldiers was not only a “se­
rious problem” but also a “threat to peace 
and stability around the world.” In the 
perception of the administration, Cuba 
symbolizes Soviet influence in the area 
and acting as a “stooge for the Soviet 
Union,” Cuba is attempting to turn the 
Caribbean into a “Red Lake.” According 
to President Reagan:
. . . I f  we do not act promptly and de­
cisively in defense of freedom, new 
Cubas will arise from the ruins of to­
day s conflicts. Make no mistake, the 
well-being and security of our neigh­
bors in this region are in our own vital 
interests . . .
Administration officials have publicly 
stipulated the following terms for im­
provement in relations with Cuba, viz., 
Cuba should:
(i) withdraw its internationalist forces 
from Africa and Nicaragua
(ii) abandon its program of supporting 
leftist guerrillas in Central America and 
“wars of liberation” in Africa and
(iii) accept the return of 2,555 Mariel 
boatlift criminals who are being held in 
U.S. jails.
The administration’s warning of an im­
pending Cuban Communist encirclement, 
as contained in a State Department re­
lease, “Cuba’s Renewed Support for Vio­
lence in Latin America,” was that “first in 
Africa and now in Latin America and the 
Caribbean,” Cuba’s policy has again 
shifted to re-emphasize the Caribbean. In 
another release, “Strategic Situation in
Central America and the Caribbean, ” the 
administration has described the follow­
ing development “as a state of danger in 
the Caribbean Basin,” viz, the fact that 
there is a:
. . . new Cuban strategy for uniting the 
left in the countries of the region, com­
mitting it to violence, arming it, train­
ing it in warfare, and attempting to use 
it for the destruction of existing govern­
ments . . .
The administration’s charge is that
“It took the United States 
almost 26 years to nor­
malize relations and to 
deal with Chairman Mao’s 
China. History may well 
repeat itse lf.. . ”
Cuba’s President Fidel Castro is capitaliz­
ing on “targets of opportunity” in the Car­
ibbean to facilitate Soviet control over an 
area the administration views as vital to 
the national security interests of the 
United States. More specifically, the ad­
ministration has accused Cuba of receiv­
ing a massive flow of Soviet arms which 
not only ossifies Cuba’s ability to project 
military power outside its own territory 
but also represents a tremendous strate­
gic gain for the Soviet Union in terms of 
its global and hemispheric aims.
The administration is also concerned 
that now Cuba is the strongest power in 
Latin America, and that the Cubans, with 
continuing Soviet assistance, will have 
considerable success in their determina­
tion “to exploit the situation (in the Carib­
bean and Central America) in ways that 
pose a potential threat to U.S. security 
interests.” The security threat that con­
cerned the administration was the tri­
angle between Cuba, Nicaragua, and 
Grenada.
In terms of the “massive” flow of So­
viet arms into Cuba, the administration 
has estimated their value at over $1 billion 
in 1982, exceeding the $600 million worth 
of weapons in 1981. The Soviet arms in­
clude “Turya” hydrofoil torpedo boats, 
M124 “Hind” assault helicopters, a 
squadron of supersonic MiG23 fighter air­
craft in an air force of 200 modern planes, 
naval vessels and 140 SAM-3 missiles.
It seems simplistic for the administra­
tion to assume that Cuba will “crumble 
under tough talk.” The administration’s 
policy toward Cuba consisting of threats, 
pressures, and the confrontational ap­
proach has not worked. And it will never 
work. Sooner or later the United States 
must deal with Cuba.
It took the United States almost 25 
years to normalize relations and to deal 
with Chairman Mao’s Communist China. 
History may well repeat itself if the U. S. 
continues to pursue its hostile policy to­
ward Cuba in view of the fact that diplo­
matic relations were broken in 1961. It is 
hoped also that future U.S. administra­
tions will accept “the policy of gradual en­
gagement”— toward Cuba— a policy that 
would not produce “miracles” overnight, 
but one that will start a dialogue, a con­
structive process.
Since the United States recognizes and 
conducts business with Communist coun­
tries like the Soviet Union, China and the 
Soviet bloc, the question that now arises 
• is why wouldn’t the U.S. normalize rela­
tions with Cuba, a country that can hardly 
be regarded as a serious threat to the na­
tional security interest of a superpower 
like the United States?
This same historical irony of U. S. pol­
icy toward the Caribbean is nowhere 
more evident than on the small island of 
Grenada. With a population of 110,000, an 
area of 133 square miles, and nutmeg as 
its major export, it is not the most likely 
threat to (any) world power.
Nevertheless, ever since the New 
Jewel Movement ousted the dictatorial 
and repressive government of Eric Gairy 
in a coup on March 13, 1979, U.S.-Gre­
nada relations had been icy and rocky at 
best. U.S. officials were convinced that 
under Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, 
the People’s Revolutionary Government 
of Grenada “seem(ed) to be on the road to 
becoming another Cuba.” They were 
futher convinced that Cuba was bent on 
developing Grenada as a “first bridgehead 
for exporting socialist revolutions to the 
English-speaking Caribbean and a base 
for Cuban intervention in South America, 
Southern Africa and U. S. shipping lines. ” 
Reagan administration officials also pub­
licly denounced the denial of human rights 
in Grenada, lack of freedom of the press, 
the detention of political prisoners, and 
the non-scheduling of general elections.
In addition, U. S. officials said that most 
Cubans in Grenada were “military ad­
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visers, some of whom infiltrate the gov­
ernment to the extent of participating in 
top-level decisions in almost every gov­
ernment ministry.” This conclusion has 
led the administration to believe that Gre­
nada’s 250 to 2,000-member army and 
several thousand-member militia “could 
pose a threat to Grenada’s neighbors.”
Grenada’s foreign policy actions also 
disturbed the administration. Grenada’s 
establishment of close diplomatic ties 
with Cuba, Nicaragua, the Soviet Union 
and countries in the Eastern Bloc had 
caused deep strategic concern for the ad­
ministration. According to Defense Sec­
retary Weinberger, in his fiscal 1983 
report to Congress:
. . .  in Grenada, Cuban influence has
reached such a high level that Grenada
can be considered a Cuban satellite
As a result of these beliefs and convic­
tions, the administration tried to isolate 
and undermine the popular Grenadian 
revolutionary progress by undertaking a 
series of action to:
□ destabilize and overthrow the 
government;
□ dissuade the European Economic 
Community (EEC) from funding the $71 
million airport at Point Salines;
□ undermine the government’s rule 
through selective military and economic 
exclusion, particularly exclusion from 
participation in the Caribbean Basin Ini­
tiative (CBI); and
□ deny diplomatic recognition to PRG’s 
representatives in Washington.
Invasion of Grenada
On October 25, 1983 [following events 
which led to Maurice Bishop’s murder], 
the United States invaded the sovereign 
nation of Grenada. As a result of the pres­
idential invasion order signed at 6:00 
p.m. on October 24, 1983, “Operation 
Urgent Fury” was set up in motion. The 
military operation consisted of a dispro­
portionately overpowering contingent of 
1,900 Marines, 5,000 paratroopers of the 
82nd Airborne Division, a war fleet of 20 
ships, and several units of Rangers, to­
gether with about 300 troops from Ja­
maica, Barbados, St. Lucia, Dominica, 
Antigua and St. Vincent.
President Reagan has stated that his 
decision to invade Grenada was dictated 
by an “urgent, formal request” on Oc­
tober 23, 1983 from five members of the 
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States 
(OECS)13 for the United States “to assist 
in a joint effort to restore order and de­
mocracy on the island of Grenada.” Both 
Barbados and Jamaica joined the OECS 
members in that request. The request 
was made in accordance with Article 8 of 
the June 1981 OECS Treaty of 
Association.
In a White House statement on Oc­
tober 26, 1983 President Reagan gave the 
following reasons for his “decisive action” 
against Grenada:
“The primary goal... is to 
transform the new Gre­
nada into a showcase for 
Reaganomics and 
democracy.”
First, and of overriding importance to 
protect innocent lives, including up to
1,000 Americans, whose personal 
safety is, of course, my paramount con­
cern. Second, to forestall further chaos. 
And third, to assist in the restoration of 
conditions of law and order and of gov­
ernmental institutions to the island of 
Grenada . . .
And in a nationally televised broadcast 
on October 27, 1983 President Reagan 
elucidated these reasons by indicating 
that U.S. forces discovered a “complete 
(Cuban) base with weapons and com­
munications equipment” which implied 
that Cuba was planning to occupy the is­
land. According to the President, “weap­
ons and ammunition (were) stacked 
almost to the ceiling enough to supply 
thousands of terrorists. ” The weapons in­
cluded small arms, assault rifles, machine 
guns, mortars and an “extremely lethal” 
anti-aircraft battery. President Reagan 
warned futher that Grenada was “a So­
viet-Cuban colony being readied as a ma­
jor military bastion to export terror and 
undermine democracy.” The President 
concluded his broadcast by assuring the 
American people that “we got there just 
in time.”
The evidence the administration has 
offered to prove its case that the military 
buildup in Grenada was indeed a serious 
threat to the security of the Caribbean 
and by extension to American security,
consisted of intelligence reports which 
warned that since September 1983 the 
Soviet Union’s activities had signaled its 
“determination to move into the Western 
Hemisphere as an imperial power and to 
stay. ”
According to U. S. intelligence calcula­
tion, the appointment of four-star General 
Gennadiy I. Sazhenov as Moscow’s offical 
ambassador to Grenada, signaled the So­
viet Union’s intention to use Granada as 
“a Soviet new world arsenal as well as an 
air, sea and communications base.” In ad­
dition, the administration has stated that 
it captured a “treasure trove of docu­
ments” which have shown that there 
were agreements for the Soviet Union, 
Cuba and North Korea to supply weapons 
to Grenada under the Bishop govern­
ment. The documents included five mili­
tary assistance treaties for arms deliv­
eries from 1980 through 1985, including 
3,050 used and re-conditioned Soviet AK 
47 assault rifles from the Soviet Union,
1.000 AK 47s from North Korea, 2,500 
used Soviet carbines, 7,000 mines,
15.000 grenades, 1,050 pistols, 293 
sniper rifles and 74 rocket-propelled gre­
nade launchers. Another supply agree­
ment with the Soviet Union called for the 
delivery of 12,600 military uniforms, 
25,200 pairs of socks and 6,300 belts, 
helmets and pairs of boots.
Under these five military treaties, Gre­
nada was also to receive $25.8 million in 
aid from the Soviet Union and $12 million 
from North Korea. And as a final effort to 
prove that the Grenada invasion was 
“right,” the administration publicly dis­
played the 451 tons of captured munitions 
at Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland 
on Veterans Day, November 11, 1983. 
Some of the items from Grenada included 
5.5 million rounds of 7.62 ammunition; 
86,332 rounds of 23mm antiaircraft am- 
muntion; 1,200 sticks of dynamite; 1,626 
Soviet AK 47 rifles; 180 Soviet M1945 
submachine guns; ten 82mm mortars; 
1,824 grenades; and eight 73mm SPG9 
recoilless guns.
The Reagan administration, therefore, 
concluded that, based on the huge volume 
of weapons and the captured ammuni­
tions, Grenada was “building a military 
force out of proportion to the island’s size 
or military needs.” Or in the words of 
Vice President Bush: “I guess everything 
we heard is true. This . . . awesome dis­
play of arms . . . doesn’t look like a 
friendly type of an arsenal to promote
NEW DIRECTIONS OCTOBER 1984
tourism somehow,” alluding to slain 
Prime Minister Maurice Bishop’s oft re­
peated reference to the PRG’s program to 
promote tourism.14
Needless to say, the administration re­
ceived much public fulcrum for its action. 
For example, Admiral Wesley L. 
McDonald, the Atlantic Commander-in- 
chief who ran the military operation, has 
stated that the President was justified in 
invading Grenada because of the Cuban 
military build-up on the island beween 
October 6-18, 1983; the impersonation as 
construction workers by Cuban soldiers; 
and the existence of a terrorist training 
base.
Also, a Newsweek Poll on Intervention 
published November 7, 1983 indicated 
that 53% of the respondents approved the 
invasion of Grenada, 69% agreed with the 
President that his action was necessary 
“to protect the lives of Americans on the 
island and assist those who want to 
leave,” while 48% agreed that the invas­
ion was justified in order “to replace the 
Marxist revolutionaries who had seized 
power. ”
Not to be outdone, certain members of 
the OECS came out in their support of the 
invasion. According to Prime Minister 
John Compton of St. Lucia, the Cuban 
“military build-up” was the main reason 
that the OECS sought U.S. help. “The 
United States came to our aid because we 
thought the military build-up was threat­
ening the whole of the southern Carib­
bean,” he said.
Dominica’s Prime Minister Eugenia 
Charles, who once described the modus 
operandi of the PRG as an “aberration,” 
suggested that: “It is not a matter of an 
invasion. It is a matter of preventing this 
thing (Marxist revolution) from spreading 
to the islands.” The administration also 
received support from right wing-Grena- 
dians in the United States. Francis Paul, 
vice president of the Grenada Democratic 
Movement, for example, indicated: “I 
don’t consider the envent as an invasion; I 
consider it a liberating force.” 
Postmortem
By November 3, 1983, the administration 
was convinced that hostilities had ended 
in Grenada so that the troops (described 
by President Reagan as “heroes of free­
dom”) could be withdrawn. However, the 
White House had decided that 2,300 
troops would remain in Grenada to be 
withdrawn by December 23, 1983, thus 
falling within the initial 60-day period that
allowed the President, under the 1973 
War Powers Resolution [WPR], to intro­
duce troops in a hostile area before trig­
gering the resolution’s restrictive 
provisions.
It was also decided that another 2,000 
“non-combat” troops would remain for an 
indefinite period. The casualty toll from 
the invasion was high; provisional figures 
as of mid-November indicated that for 
Cuba there were 57 wounded, 634 cap­
tured as prisoners and 71 dead; for Gre­
nada, there were 160 killed, 111 
wounded, and 68 captured; the casualty 
figures for the United States were 18 
killed, and 113 wounded with none 
missing.
As a post-mortem to the invasion, the 
Reagan administration announced that 
the Agency for International Develop­
ment (AID) would carry out a $3.5 million 
disaster assistance program in Grenada. 
The program allocated $750,000 for 
drinking water-related equipment, $1.5 
million for roads, $250,000 for “mobiliza­
tion of social and community organiza­
tions” and $500,000 for health programs.
The overall $3.5 million assistance 
package was in addition to the $475,000 
in emergency aid already given to Gre­
nada. In addition, Congress has ear­
marked “up to $15 million” for develop­
ment assistance to Grenada over the next 
11 months, while the Pentagon has agreed 
to pay the costs of the 300-member Car­
ibbean police force to the tune of $6 
million.
The administration also sent an “inter­
agency private sector team” to Grenada 
to ascertain to what extent the American 
business community (capitalists) can as­
sist in the economic re-vitalization of 
Grenada. The primary goal here of course 
is to transform the new Grenada into a 
showcase for Reaganomics and democ­
racy. This strategy is analogous to the 24- 
member blue-chip private sector group 
that President Reagan set up for Jamaica, 
which culminated in the joint Jamaica- 
American Private Sector Committee.15
The administration’s policy toward 
Grenada indeed sends a clear signal to 
other Caribbean nations that President 
Reagan is determined that no Caribbean 
country would be allowed to become a 
camp from which a leftist/progressive 
revolutionary “virus’Vprocess can be ex­
ported to other neighboring Caribbean 
states. The administration’s policy is to 
install right-wing, conservative govern­
ments, at least in the English-speaking 
Caribbean, so as to protect “perceived” 
American security interests . . .
The unknown variable in this geo-polit­
ical equation is: Which Caribbean nation is 
next in line for an invasion? □
Linus A. Hoskins, Ph.D., is an assistant professor 
in the International Studies Program, School of 
Human Ecology, Howard University. The above 
was excerpted from his 95-page study on “U.S.-Car- 
ibbean-Grenada Relations: Before and After 
Bishop. ”
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